A characterization of Approval Voting without the approval balloting assumption
| Autor: | Federica Ceron, Stéphane Gonzalez |
|---|---|
| Přispěvatelé: | Dao, Taï, Université Paris-Est Créteil Val-de-Marne - Paris 12 (UPEC UP12), Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - UFR d'Économie (UP1 UFR02), Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (UP1), Université Jean Monnet [Saint-Étienne] (UJM), Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne), École normale supérieure - Lyon (ENS Lyon)-Université Lumière - Lyon 2 (UL2)-Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 (UCBL), Université de Lyon-Université de Lyon-Université Jean Monnet [Saint-Étienne] (UJM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne (UJM), Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne), École normale supérieure de Lyon (ENS de Lyon)-Université Lumière - Lyon 2 (UL2)-Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 (UCBL), Université de Lyon-Université de Lyon-Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne (UJM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Université de Lyon-Université Jean Monnet [Saint-Étienne] (UJM)-Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 (UCBL), Université de Lyon-Université Lumière - Lyon 2 (UL2)-École normale supérieure - Lyon (ENS Lyon) |
| Jazyk: | angličtina |
| Rok vydání: | 2019 |
| Předmět: |
Evaluative voting
media_common.quotation_subject Informational basis 05 social sciences JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory/C.C7.C71 - Cooperative Games 16. Peace & justice [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance Outcome (game theory) Ballot Consistency (negotiation) Voting 0502 economics and business Economics Approval voting Relevance (law) Normative 050206 economic theory balloting procedure 050207 economics [SHS.ECO] Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance Axiom Law and economics media_common |
| Popis: | We provide an axiomatic characterization of Approval Voting without the approval balloting assumption. The dichotomous structure of the informational basis of Approval voting as well as its aggregative rationale are jointly derived from a set of normative conditions on the voting procedure. The first one is the well-known social-theoretic principle of consistency; the second one, ballot richness, requires voters to be able to express a sufficiently rich set of opinions; the last one, dubbed no single-voter overrides, demands that the addition of a voter to an electorate cannot radically change the outcome of the election. Such result is promising insofar it suggests that the informational basis of voting may have a normative relevance that deserves formal treatment. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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