Not All Strangers Are the Same: The Impact of Tolerance in Schelling Games

Autor:	Kanellopoulos, Panagiotis, Kyropoulou, Maria, Voudouris, Alexandros A.
Jazyk:	angličtina
Rok vydání:	2022
Předmět:	FOS: Computer and information sciences Price of stability Computer Science - Computer Science and Game Theory Schelling games Equilibria Price of anarchy Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) Theory of computation → Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design
DOI:	10.4230/lipics.mfcs.2022.60
Popis:	Schelling’s famous model of segregation assumes agents of different types, who would like to be located in neighborhoods having at least a certain fraction of agents of the same type. We consider natural generalizations that allow for the possibility of agents being tolerant towards other agents, even if they are not of the same type. In particular, we consider an ordering of the types, and make the realistic assumption that the agents are in principle more tolerant towards agents of types that are closer to their own according to the ordering. Based on this, we study the strategic games induced when the agents aim to maximize their utility, for a variety of tolerance levels. We provide a collection of results about the existence of equilibria, and their quality in terms of social welfare. LIPIcs, Vol. 241, 47th International Symposium on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science (MFCS 2022), pages 60:1-60:14
Databáze:	OpenAIRE
Externí odkaz:	https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::a76c394fd022bee7c2bee775c36f23ad Zobrazit plný text záznamu