Deterrence, settlement, and litigation under adversarial versus inquisitorial systems

Autor:	Alice Guerra, Maria Maraki, Baptiste Massenot, Christian Thöni
Přispěvatelé:	Guerra, Alice, Maraki, Maria, Massenot, Baptiste, Thöni, Christian
Rok vydání:	2022
Předmět:	Procedural economy · Law & economics · Adversarial system · Inquisitorial system · Litigation · Experiment History Economics and Econometrics Polymers and Plastics Sociology and Political Science Business and International Management Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering
Zdroj:	Public Choice.
ISSN:	1573-7101 0048-5829
DOI:	10.1007/s11127-022-01001-4
Popis:	In this paper, we compare deterrence, settlement, and litigation spending under adversarial and inquisitorial systems. We present a basic litigation model with three sequential stages—care, settlement, litigation—and we test the predictions on experimental data. In line with our theoretical expectations, we find that, compared with the adversarial system, the inquisitorial system is associated with lower litigation spending, lower rates of cases settled, and tends to strengthen deterrence.
Databáze:	OpenAIRE
Externí odkaz:	https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::a60c3890c7ff4f5712fd09de6964e609 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-022-01001-4 Zobrazit plný text záznamu Full text from SpringerLink