Consistency, weak fairness and the Shapley value
| Autor: | Pedro Calleja, Francesc Llerena |
|---|---|
| Jazyk: | angličtina |
| Rok vydání: | 2020 |
| Předmět: |
Computer Science::Computer Science and Game Theory
Property (philosophy) Sociology and Political Science Teoria de l'estimació Characterization (mathematics) Consistency (statistics) 0502 economics and business Eficàcia organitzativa Impossibility Estimation theory General Psychology Axiom Game theory 050205 econometrics Mathematics Equitat (Dret) 05 social sciences Null (mathematics) General Social Sciences Equity Shapley value Teoria de jocs Large set (Ramsey theory) Organizational effectiveness 050206 economic theory Statistics Probability and Uncertainty Mathematical economics |
| Zdroj: | Dipòsit Digital de la UB Universidad de Barcelona |
| Popis: | The Shapley value (Shapley, 1953) has been axiomatically characterized from different points of view. van den Brink (2001) proposes a characterization by means of efficiency, fairness and the null player property. In this paper, we characterize the family of single-valued solutions obtained by relaxing fairness into weak fairness. To point out the Shapley value, we impose the additional axiom of weak self consistency and strengthen the null player property into the dummy player property. Remarkably, impossibility results emerge when replacing self consistency by a large set of consistency properties. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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