Efficiency vs. Agency Motivations for Bank Takeovers: Some Empirical Evidence

Autor:	Claudio Doria, Carmelo Salleo, Alessio De Vincenzo
Rok vydání:	2006
Předmět:	Finance business.industry Ceteris paribus Corporate governance banking M&As pricing corporate governance market power Diversification (finance) Monetary economics jel:G34 jel:G21 Economies of scale Skills management jel:L21 Business Market power Empirical evidence
Zdroj:	SSRN Electronic Journal.
ISSN:	1556-5068
DOI:	10.2139/ssrn.914488
Popis:	Bank takeovers result on average in little improvements in performance. This may be due to conflicting driving forces behind them; however these have seldom been studied. We study directly the motivations for bank acquisitions by analyzing the prices paid for them, under the assumption that bankers are willing to pay for what they want. We find that there is no evidence that bankers are ready to pay for possible economies of scale and scope; on the other hand buyers expect to transfer their superior managerial skills to targets. Market power seems to hold little value while entry (or diversification) commands a premium. Agency issues at the buyer are also an important motivation for takeovers: other things being equal acquirers with more free capital are willing to pay more.
Databáze:	OpenAIRE
Externí odkaz:	https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::a3530920126e401ebb3f33145a27e37a https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.914488 Zobrazit plný text záznamu