Changing one’s mind: Reconsidering Fisch’s idea of framework transitions in (partly) Kierkegaardian fashion
| Autor: | Heiko Schulz |
|---|---|
| Jazyk: | angličtina |
| Rok vydání: | 2020 |
| Předmět: |
understanding
010506 paleontology Philosophy event B1-5802 06 humanities and the arts 0603 philosophy ethics and religion 01 natural sciences framework transition self principle of charity transperspectivism kierkegaard pre-rationality ddc:100 060302 philosophy subjectivity Philosophy (General) 0105 earth and related environmental sciences |
| Zdroj: | Open Philosophy, Vol 3, Iss 1, Pp 750-769 (2020) |
| ISSN: | 2543-8875 |
| Popis: | The article critically engages Menachem Fisch’s account of normative frameworks, in particular of (rational) transitions between them. I argue, first, that exposure to the normative criticism leveled at us by other human beings is indeed “capable of destabilizing normative commitment” to one’s own underlying framework beliefs and standards, as Fisch holds; however, closer scrutiny reveals that such exposure is neither sufficient nor necessary but rather accidental in this respect. Second, I will try to show that Søren Kierkegaard’s account of how people fundamentally change their mind provides resources for both a substantial critique of Fisch and a more adequate understanding of the transitions in question. The article argues, third, that Fisch’s framework model – though meaningful, in fact heuristically indispensable in and as of itself – has robust transcendental implications which as such are being ignored, if not directly denied by Fisch and, precisely by being ignored or denied, unnecessarily weaken the overall plausibility of his account. Finally, and ex post, I will address an important objection raised by some commentators. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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