Strategy-proof assignment of multiple resources
| Autor: | Karol Flores-Szwagrzak, Albin Erlanson |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2015 |
| Předmět: |
Computer Science::Computer Science and Game Theory
Economics and Econometrics Mathematical optimization Strategy-proofness Concave function Mechanism (biology) Rationing Resource-monotonicity Extension (predicate logic) Domain (software engineering) Set (abstract data type) Consistency (database systems) Economics Consistency Mathematical economics Parametric statistics |
| Zdroj: | Erlanson, A & Szwagrzak, K 2015, ' Strategy-Proof Assignment Of Multiple Resources ', Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 159, no. Part A, pp. 137-162 . https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.05.016 |
| ISSN: | 0022-0531 |
| DOI: | 10.1016/j.jet.2015.05.016 |
| Popis: | We examine the strategy-proof allocation of multiple resources; an application is the assignment of packages of tasks, workloads, and compensations among the members of an organization. In the domain of multidimensional single-peaked preferences, we find that any allocation mechanism obtained by maximizing a separably concave function over a polyhedral extension of the set of Pareto-efficient allocations is strategy-proof. Moreover, these are the only strategy-proof, unanimous, consistent, and resource-monotonic mechanisms. These mechanisms generalize the parametric rationing mechanisms ( Young, 1987 ), some of which date back to the Babylonian Talmud. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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