Equilibrium selection in interdependent value auctions
| Autor: | Elnaz Bajoori, Dries Vermeulen |
|---|---|
| Přispěvatelé: | QE Operations research, RS: GSBE Theme Conflict & Cooperation, RS: GSBE Theme Data-Driven Decision-Making |
| Jazyk: | angličtina |
| Rok vydání: | 2019 |
| Předmět: |
TheoryofComputation_MISCELLANEOUS
Class (set theory) Computer Science::Computer Science and Game Theory Sociology and Political Science Bayesian probability Social Sciences(all) Type (model theory) Order (exchange) 0502 economics and business PURE-STRATEGY EQUILIBRIA Common value auction Psychology(all) General Psychology 050205 econometrics Mathematics 05 social sciences General Social Sciences TheoryofComputation_GENERAL BAYESIAN GAMES Action (physics) EXISTENCE Equilibrium selection 050206 economic theory PERFECT EQUILIBRIUM Statistics Probability and Uncertainty Value (mathematics) Mathematical economics |
| Zdroj: | Bajoori, E & Vermeulen, D 2019, ' Equilibrium selection in interdependent-value auctions ', Mathematical Social Sciences, vol. 98, pp. 47-56 . https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2019.01.003 Mathematical Social Sciences, 98, 47-56. Elsevier |
| ISSN: | 0165-4896 |
| DOI: | 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2019.01.003 |
| Popis: | In second-price auctions with interdependent values, bidders do not necessarily have dominant strategies. Moreover, such auctions may have many equilibria. In order to rule out the less intuitive equilibria, we define the notion of distributional strictly perfect equilibrium (DSPE) for Bayesian games with infinite type and action spaces. This equilibrium is robust against arbitrary small perturbations of strategies. We apply DSPE to a class of symmetric second-price auctions with interdependent values. We show that the efficient equilibrium defined by Milgrom (1981) is a DSPE, while a class of less intuitive, inefficient, equilibria introduced by Birulin (2003) is not. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
|
Full Text from ScienceDirect