Equilibrium selection in experimental cheap talk games
| Autor: | Adrian de Groot Ruiz, Sander Onderstal, Theo Offerman |
|---|---|
| Přispěvatelé: | Markets & Organizations (ASE, FEB), Experimental and Political Economics / CREED (ASE, FEB) |
| Jazyk: | angličtina |
| Rok vydání: | 2015 |
| Předmět: |
jel:C92
Computer Science::Computer Science and Game Theory Economics and Econometrics Cheap talk Neologism proofness Credible deviation Refinement ACDC Experiment jel:C72 jel:D82 jel:D83 Stability (learning theory) TheoryofComputation_GENERAL Rational agent Measure (mathematics) Range (mathematics) Cheap talk Equilibrium selection Economics Mathematical economics Finance |
| Zdroj: | Games and Economic Behavior, 91, 14-25. Academic Press Inc. |
| ISSN: | 0899-8256 |
| Popis: | Published in 'Games and Economic Behavior' . In the past, many refinements have been proposed to select equilibria in cheap talk games. Usually, these refinements were motivated by a discussion of how rational agents would reason in some particular cheap talk games. In this paper, we propose a new refinement and stability measure that is intended to predict actual behavior in a wide range of cheap talk games. According to our Average Credible Deviation Criterion (ACDC), the stability of an equilibrium is determined by the frequency and size of credible deviations. ACDC organizes the results from several cheap talk experiments in which behavior converged to equilibrium, even in cases where other criteria do not make a prediction. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
|
Full Text from ScienceDirect