Full Implementation and Belief Restrictions
| Autor: | Mariann Ollár, Antonio Penta |
|---|---|
| Přispěvatelé: | Research programme EEF |
| Jazyk: | angličtina |
| Rok vydání: | 2017 |
| Předmět: |
ASCENDING AUCTIONS
Economics and Econometrics Mathematical optimization PRIVATE-VALUES Context (language use) UNCERTAINTY DOMINANT-STRATEGY IMPLEMENTATION GAMES INFORMATIONAL SIZE Simple (abstract algebra) 0502 economics and business Economics RATIONALIZABILITY 050207 economics Baseline (configuration management) 050205 econometrics EFFICIENT AUCTIONS Mechanism design Mechanism (biology) Welfare economics 05 social sciences MECHANISM DESIGN Rationalizability Moment (mathematics) ROBUST VIRTUAL IMPLEMENTATION Benchmark (computing) |
| Zdroj: | American Economic Review, 107(8), 2243-2277. AMER ECONOMIC ASSOC |
| ISSN: | 0002-8282 |
| Popis: | We introduce a framework to study the problem of full implementation under general restrictions on agents’beliefs, which we call �-Implementation. First we provide a characterization of the properties of the mechanisms that achieve �-Implementation. These conditions relate the possibility of achieving full implementation to the strength of the strategic externalities induced by the mechanism. We then study how to achieve full implementation via the design of simple transfer schemes. In these context, the general conditions for �-Implementation suggest a simple design principle, in which belief restrictions are used to weaken the strategic externalities induced by the baseline transfers of the belief-free benchmark. Importantly, our results require minimal information on agents’beliefs, which regard simple moments of the distribution of types. These moment conditions arise naturally in applications and in practical problems of mechanism design. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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