Breaking collusion in auctions through speculation: an experiment on CO2 emission permit markets
| Autor: | Michel Mougeot, Jean-Louis Rullière, Benjamin Pelloux, Florence Naegelen |
|---|---|
| Přispěvatelé: | Experimental and Political Economics / CREED (ASE, FEB) |
| Jazyk: | angličtina |
| Rok vydání: | 2011 |
| Předmět: |
TheoryofComputation_MISCELLANEOUS
Economics and Econometrics Proxy bid Sociology and Political Science Auction theory Dutch auction TheoryofComputation_GENERAL Reverse auction Microeconomics Revenue equivalence Multiunit auction Economics Vickrey auction English auction Finance Industrial organization |
| Zdroj: | Journal of Public Economic Theory, 13(5), 829-856. Wiley-Blackwell |
| ISSN: | 1467-9779 1097-3923 |
| Popis: | The European Emission Trading Scheme (EU-ETS) has chosen to adopt an auctioning procedure to initially allocate CO2 emission permits. Free allocation of permits will become an exception for the third phase (2013-2020) and most firms will have to buy all their permits on the market or via auctions. The ability of bidders to collude is a key concern about the design of the auction format. To counter collusion, the auction can be open to bidders without compliance obligations (speculators). This paper aims at studying experimentally speculation as a collusion-breaking device in two different auction mechanisms: the uniform-price sealed-bid auction and the ascending clock auction. Our results suggest that a uniform sealed-bid auction open to speculators should be chosen from a revenue maximization point of view. In this mechanism, compliance agents adopt an aggressive strategy toward speculators. This strategy significantly increases the seller's revenue, compared to the more collusive clock auction. In the latter, on the contrary, bidders accommodate speculators, letting them buy permits in the auction and buying their necessary permits on the secondary market. However, as opening the auction to speculators deteriorates efficiency, the regulator faces a trade-off between these two objectives. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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