Hart–Mas-Colell consistency and the core in convex games
| Autor: | Peter Sudhölter, Bas Dietzenbacher |
|---|---|
| Přispěvatelé: | QE Math. Economics & Game Theory, RS: GSBE other - not theme-related research |
| Rok vydání: | 2021 |
| Předmět: |
Statistics and Probability
Computer Science::Computer Science and Game Theory Economics and Econometrics Superadditivity Consistency (knowledge bases) Computer Science::Computational Geometry Domain (mathematical analysis) Homothetic transformation AXIOMATIZATION Mathematics (miscellaneous) c71 - Cooperative Games Converse Shapley value Transferable utility Mathematics consistency Converse consistency core Cooperative Games Core (game theory) Convex games Statistics Probability and Uncertainty Mathematical economics REDUCED GAME Social Sciences (miscellaneous) |
| Zdroj: | International Journal of Game Theory, 51(2), 413-429. Springer |
| ISSN: | 1432-1270 0020-7276 |
| Popis: | This paper formally introduces Hart–Mas-Colell consistency for general (possibly multi-valued) solutions for cooperative games with transferable utility. This notion is used to axiomatically characterize the core on the domain of convex games. Moreover, we characterize all nonempty solutions satisfying individual rationality, anonymity, scale covariance, superadditivity, weak Hart–Mas-Colell consistency, and converse Hart–Mas-Colell consistency. This family consists of (a) the Shapley value, (b) all homothetic images of the core with the Shapley value as center of homothety and with positive ratios of homothety not larger than one, and (c) their relative interiors. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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