A Formal Analysis of 5G Authentication
| Autor: | Jannik Dreier, Saša Radomirović, Vincent Stettler, David Basin, Ralf Sasse, Lucca Hirschi |
|---|---|
| Přispěvatelé: | Department of Computer Science [ETH Zürich] (D-INFK), Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule - Swiss Federal Institute of Technology [Zürich] (ETH Zürich), Proof techniques for security protocols (PESTO), Inria Nancy - Grand Est, Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique (Inria)-Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique (Inria)-Department of Formal Methods (LORIA - FM), Laboratoire Lorrain de Recherche en Informatique et ses Applications (LORIA), Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Université de Lorraine (UL)-Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique (Inria)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Université de Lorraine (UL)-Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique (Inria)-Laboratoire Lorrain de Recherche en Informatique et ses Applications (LORIA), Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Université de Lorraine (UL)-Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique (Inria)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Université de Lorraine (UL), University of Dundee, Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique (Inria)-Université de Lorraine (UL)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique (Inria)-Université de Lorraine (UL)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Laboratoire Lorrain de Recherche en Informatique et ses Applications (LORIA), Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique (Inria)-Université de Lorraine (UL)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Université de Lorraine (UL)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS) |
| Jazyk: | angličtina |
| Rok vydání: | 2018 |
| Předmět: |
FOS: Computer and information sciences
Computer Science - Cryptography and Security Computer science 5G standard authentication protocols AKA protocol symbolic verification formal analysis 02 engineering and technology Computer security computer.software_genre C.2.2 [INFO.INFO-CR]Computer Science [cs]/Cryptography and Security [cs.CR] 0202 electrical engineering electronic engineering information engineering AKA Protocol (science) Authentication business.industry Mobile broadband D.2.4 020206 networking & telecommunications D.4.6 Cryptographic protocol Authenticated Key Exchange 020201 artificial intelligence & image processing Mobile telephony business computer Cryptography and Security (cs.CR) 5G |
| Zdroj: | ACM CCS 2018-25th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security ACM CCS 2018-25th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, Oct 2018, Toronto, Canada. ⟨10.1145/3243734.3243846⟩ Proceedings of the 2018 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS'18) Proceedings of the 2018 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security |
| DOI: | 10.1145/3243734.3243846⟩ |
| Popis: | Mobile communication networks connect much of the world's population. The security of users' calls, SMSs, and mobile data depends on the guarantees provided by the Authenticated Key Exchange protocols used. For the next-generation network (5G), the 3GPP group has standardized the 5G AKA protocol for this purpose. We provide the first comprehensive formal model of a protocol from the AKA family: 5G AKA. We also extract precise requirements from the 3GPP standards defining 5G and we identify missing security goals. Using the security protocol verification tool Tamarin, we conduct a full, systematic, security evaluation of the model with respect to the 5G security goals. Our automated analysis identifies the minimal security assumptions required for each security goal and we find that some critical security goals are not met, except under additional assumptions missing from the standard. Finally, we make explicit recommendations with provably secure fixes for the attacks and weaknesses we found. Proceedings of the 2018 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS'18) ISBN:978-1-4503-5693-0 |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
|