Licensing with free entry
| Autor: | Johannes Muthers, Toker Doganoglu, Firat Inceoglu |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2020 |
| Předmět: |
L41
free entry L21 jel:D45 Patent licensing Innovator Management of Technology and Innovation 0502 economics and business ddc:330 medicine Economics 050207 economics Free entry Industrial organization L13 K11 05 social sciences L11 quantity competition jel:L11 Commerce jel:K11 D45 medicine.symptom General Economics Econometrics and Finance 050203 business & management |
| Zdroj: | Economics of Innovation and New Technology. :1-18 |
| ISSN: | 1476-8364 1043-8599 |
| DOI: | 10.1080/10438599.2020.1761590 |
| Popis: | We introduce a fairly general licensing model with an endogenous industry structure - in terms of number of active firms - and general licensing contracts. We show that when the patentee can employ contracts that can condition on market entry or price, it can implement an outcome that yields monopoly profits by awarding the license to a single firm. Furthermore, when the patentee can only use contracts based on the quantities of the licensees, it still captures the entire market via a single licensee, albeit not at the monopoly price. Commonly assumed two-part tariff contracts cannot duplicate this last outcome and yield lower profits. We discuss the welfare implications of various contractual schemes. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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