Public spending on health as political instrument? Regime-type dependency of public spending
Autor: | Angela Münch, Andreas Freytag, David Fielding |
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Jazyk: | angličtina |
Rok vydání: | 2020 |
Předmět: |
ResearchInstitutes_Networks_Beacons/global_development_institute
i18 Political freedom Autocracy Dictatorship Public spending Politics selection effect 0502 economics and business Health care Development economics 050602 political science & public administration Economics ddc:330 050207 economics HB71-74 H51 I18 business.industry 05 social sciences public spending 0506 political science Economics as a science Global Development Institute Wintrobe health regime wintrobe Economic model business h51 Dependency (project management) |
Zdroj: | Münch, A, Fielding, D & Freytag, A 2020, ' Public Spending on Health as Political Instrument? – Regime-type dependency of public spending ', Open Economics, vol. 3, no. 1, pp. 121-134 . https://doi.org/10.1515/openec-2020-0108 Open Economics, Vol 3, Iss 1, Pp 121-134 (2020) |
DOI: | 10.1515/openec-2020-0108 |
Popis: | The paper argues that the level of public spending on health varies according to the type of political regime in a country. A simple political economic model is employed to analyse the rationale of policy makers when implementing healthcare policy. The theory of dictatorship as described by Wintrobe (1990, 1998, 2001) is used to differentiate between the types of autocratic regimes. Furthermore, an empirical analysis is conducted for 170 countries for the years 1995-2014. We found that public spending on health is decreasing with the level of political freedom. At the same time, public spending on health care competes with military expenditures. Moreover, public spending on health in neighbouring countries affects the level of public spending within the country. |
Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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