Regulatory Objectives and the Intensity of Unbundling in Electricity Markets
| Autor: | Henrik Lindemann |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2015 |
| Předmět: |
Government
business.industry jel:D73 media_common.quotation_subject Legal Unbundling Ownership Unbundling Regulatory Authorities Regulatory Objectives Cournot competition jel:L51 jel:L50 jel:L94 Competition (economics) jel:L12 Promotion (rank) jel:L42 Agency (sociology) jel:L13 Electricity Unbundling business Industrial organization media_common Downstream (petroleum industry) |
| Popis: | Despite the positive effect electricity grids separated from generation and supply by ownership are expected to have on the level of competition in the non-network activities, several EU member states still adhere to a solely legally unbundled transmission grid. This choice might be induced by regulators focusing on objectives other than the promotion of consumer interests: theoretically analyzing the decisions an authority takes on both the unbundling regime and the grid charge when it supervises a network monopolist providing a downstream Cournot duopoly with capacity, we find an agency pursuing consumer-oriented goals to always implement Ownership Unbundling. For a regulator acting in the interests of the industry or the government, though, results suggest the authority to be indifferent between Legal and Ownership Unbundling; minor potential drawbacks of a network separated by ownership for the agency or the companies might then tip the scales and cause the regulator to adhere to Legal Unbundling. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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