A class of N-player Colonel Blotto games with multidimensional private information

Autor: Ewerhart, Christian, Kovenock, Dan
Přispěvatelé: University of Zurich, Ewerhart, Christian
Jazyk: angličtina
Rok vydání: 2021
Předmět:
Popis: In this paper, we study N-player Colonel Blotto games with incomplete information about battlefield valuations. Such games arise in job markets, research and development, electoral competition, security analysis, and conflict resolution. For M Ï N + 1 battlefields, we identify a Bayes-Nash equilibrium in which the resource allocation to a given battlefield is strictly monotone in the valuation of that battlefield. We also explore extensions such as heterogeneous budgets, the case M È N, full-support type distributions, and network games. Revised version, February 2021
Databáze: OpenAIRE