Paying Not to Sell
| Autor: | Rania Mabrouk, Emanuele Bacchiega, Olivier Bonroy |
|---|---|
| Přispěvatelé: | Laboratoire d'Economie Appliquée de Grenoble (GAEL), Université Pierre Mendès France - Grenoble 2 (UPMF)-Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA), Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-Université Pierre Mendès France - Grenoble 2 (UPMF), Laboratoire d'Economie Appliquée = Grenoble Applied Economics Laboratory (GAEL), Emanuele Bacchiega, Olivier Bonroy, Rania Mabrouk |
| Rok vydání: | 2013 |
| Předmět: |
Economics and Econometrics
vertical product differentiation ComputerApplications_COMPUTERSINOTHERSYSTEMS MONOPOLY VERTICAL PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION VERTICAL RELATIONSHIPS MONOPOLY VERTICAL PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION VERTICAL RELATIONSHIP Microeconomics Power (social and political) Contractual relationship 0502 economics and business ddc:330 050207 economics Monopoly Vertical product differentiation Vertical relationships Industrial organization 050205 econometrics L12 L13 L14 05 social sciences [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance SECS-P/01 Economia politica jel:L12 Commerce Quaderni - Working Paper DSE jel:L13 jel:L14 ComputingMilieux_COMPUTERSANDSOCIETY Position (finance) Business Finance |
| Zdroj: | Economics Letters Economics Letters, Elsevier, 2013, 121 (1), pp.137-140. ⟨10.1016/j.econlet.2013.07.018⟩ Bacchiega, Emanuele ; Bonroy, Olivier ; Mabrouk, Rania (2013) Paying not to sell. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 10. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/3893 |
| ISSN: | 1556-5068 0165-1765 |
| Popis: | International audience; In this paper the authors show that, in the presence of buyer and seller power, a monopolist can enter into a costly contractual relationship with a low-quality supplier with the sole intention of improving its bargaining position relative to a high-quality supplier, without ever selling the good produced by that firm. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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