Social norms, sanctions, and conditional entry in markets with externalities: Evidence from an artefactual field experiment
Autor: | Tobias Riehm, Nicolas Fugger, Philippe Gillen, Vitali Gretschko, Peter Werner |
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Přispěvatelé: | Microeconomics & Public Economics, RS: GSBE UM-BIC |
Jazyk: | angličtina |
Rok vydání: | 2022 |
Předmět: |
Economics and Econometrics
INFORMATION STRATEGIES ENFORCEMENT DETERMINANTS PREFERENCES GAMES Experiment Punishment Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles Large population sample COOPERATION Negative externalities d01 - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles RECIPROCITY Social norms Field Experiments Moral behavior c93 - Field Experiments Externalities Altruism Philanthropy d62 - Externalities Finance Markets BEHAVIOR |
Zdroj: | Journal of Public Economics, 212:104701. Elsevier |
ISSN: | 0047-2727 |
DOI: | 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2022.104701 |
Popis: | In an artefactual field experiment with a large and heterogeneous population sample, we test the impli-cations of social norms for market interactions associated with negative real-world externalities. We run large stylized markets in which sellers and buyers decide whether to enter the market and how much to bid for experimental coupons. Trading leads to profits for sellers and buyers but at the same time destroys donations for a good cause. Calculated over all our treatments, we observe that two-thirds of the participants refuse to trade. Eliciting a controlled measure for conditional moral behavior in one treatment, we find that roughly a quarter of potential traders make their decisions contingent on the decisions of others, indicating that the desire to conform to social norms affects trading decisions in markets with negative externalities. If observers can sanction traders, we find that more than 80% of them are willing to incur personal costs to sanction trading, thus enforcing a social norm for moral behavior.(c) 2022 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. |
Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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