A characterization of the uniform rule with several commodities and agents
| Autor: | Shuhei Morimoto, Stephen Ching, Shigehiro Serizawa |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2012 |
| Předmět: |
Computer Science::Computer Science and Game Theory
Economics and Econometrics Class (set theory) Computer science Group (mathematics) Characterization (mathematics) Strategy proofness Separable space Computer Science::Multiagent Systems If and only if Unanimity Economics Symmetry (geometry) Focus (optics) Convex function Mathematical economics Social Sciences (miscellaneous) |
| Zdroj: | Social Choice and Welfare. 40:871-911 |
| ISSN: | 1432-217X 0176-1714 |
| DOI: | 10.1007/s00355-011-0648-9 |
| Popis: | We consider a problem of allocating infinitely divisible commodities among a group of agents. More specifically, there are several commodities to be allocated and agents have continuous, strictly convex, and separable preferences. We establish that a rule satisfies strategy-proofness, unanimity, weak symmetry, and nonbossiness if and only if it is the uniform rule. This result extends to the class of continuous, strictly convex, and multidimensional single-peaked preferences. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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