Board reforms and firm value: Worldwide evidence
| Autor: | Xi Li, Larry Fauver, Alvaro G. Taboada, Mingyi Hung |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2017 |
| Předmět: |
Economics and Econometrics
Strategy and Management media_common.quotation_subject Common law Audit committee Accounting Financial system jel:K22 0502 economics and business Economics Chief executive officer Valuation (finance) media_common 040101 forestry 050208 finance business.industry 05 social sciences Enterprise value 04 agricultural and veterinary sciences jel:G34 Independence cross-country study firm value governance reforms jel:G15 Civil law (legal system) 0401 agriculture forestry and fisheries Business Finance |
| Zdroj: | Journal of Financial Economics. 125:120-142 |
| ISSN: | 0304-405X |
| DOI: | 10.1016/j.jfineco.2017.04.010 |
| Popis: | We examine the impact of corporate board reforms on firm value in 41 countries. Using a difference-in-differences design, we find that firm value increases after enactment of the reforms. The valuation increase is associated with both the intensity and major components of the reform, including board independence, audit committee, and the separation of the roles of chief executive officer and chairman. We also find that the effect of these reforms primarily exists in countries with weak legal institutions. In addition, the effect of reforms is concentrated among comply-or-explain reforms, and the role of country-level institutions is less important for these reforms than for regulation reforms. Taken together, our findings suggest exogenously introduced governance changes benefit shareholders, mainly in countries with weak institutional quality and for reforms with a comply-or-explain approach. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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