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This paper was presented at the BCMH New Researchers Conference, London on 27 November 2021. (http://www.bcmh.org.uk/event/call-for-papers-bcmh-new-researchers-conference-26-27-november-2021/) Abstract:The use of intelligence is always considered crucial during times of crisis and war. A small crisis in Taba (Egypt), suddenly erupted in early 1906 owing to a border dispute in the Sinai Peninsula, presents a good case where intelligence played an important role. During the crisis and its aftermath, the option of forcing the Dardanelles Straits to coerce the Ottomans was proposed and discussed in Whitehall. However, such a scheme was rejected by the Committee of Imperial Defence following a joint study by the intelligence and fighting departments. The main reason for the proposal being rejected is intelligence that had been collected since the Great Eastern Crisis of 1875-78. Recently established military and naval intelligence services had compiled information and produced regular reports that demonstrated how Turkish defences had been strengthened following the defeat in the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78 and thus put forward the risks of forcing the Straits. Taba Crisis demonstrates how intelligence was successfully used in a crisis and impacted the government���s decision-making. The Crisis is also important as it led the way the last important assessment on the Dardanelles before the Gallipoli Campaign of 1915 being made. What makes it more significant is the fact that British military and political figures who would also be in similar positions in 1915 were involved in discussions in 1906-7. This case also supports the argument that British intelligence services were actually effective and produced regular intelligence reports before the foundation of Secret Service Bureau, the predecessor of MI6. |
