Dicisigns and habits:Implicit propositions and habit-taking in Peirce’s pragmatism
| Autor: | Frederik Stjernfelt |
|---|---|
| Přispěvatelé: | West, Donna, Anderson, Myrdene |
| Jazyk: | angličtina |
| Rok vydání: | 2016 |
| Předmět: | |
| Zdroj: | Stjernfelt, F 2016, Dicisigns and habits : Implicit propositions and habit-taking in Peirce’s pragmatism . in D West & M Anderson (eds), Consensus on Peirce’s concept of Habit : Before and beyond consciousness ., Article 14, Springer, cham switzerland, Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics, pp. 241-64 . https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-45920-2_14 Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics ISBN: 9783319459189 |
| DOI: | 10.1007/978-3-319-45920-2_14 |
| Popis: | Peirce’s notion of “habit” is famously wide, including also natural dispositions. Another Peircean notion generalized from its normal use is his term for propositions, “Dicisigns”. What is the connection between the two? It goes via the pragmatist notion of belief: “A belief in a proposition is a controlled and contented habit of acting in ways that will be productive of desired results only if the proposition is true” (Kaina Stoicheia 1904). This paper charts the important connection between habits, beliefs and Dicisigns. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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