Environmental research joint ventures and time-consistent emission tax: Endogenous choice of R&D formation
| Autor: | Daisaku Goto, Yasunori Ouchida |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2016 |
| Předmět: |
Environmental R&D
Economics and Econometrics 020209 energy Information sharing 05 social sciences Emission tax Time-consistent emission tax Environmental research Social Welfare 02 engineering and technology Cournot competition Environmental research joint venture Microeconomics Competition (economics) Competition policy 0502 economics and business 0202 electrical engineering electronic engineering information engineering Economics Precommitment Cournot duopoly 050207 economics Inefficiency |
| Zdroj: | Economic Modelling. 55:179-188 |
| ISSN: | 0264-9993 |
| DOI: | 10.1016/j.econmod.2016.01.025 |
| Popis: | This paper provides a new analytical framework of endogenous choice for environmental R&D formation. Furthermore, this paper presents an examination of environmental R&D of four types in a Cournot duopoly in a setting where a regulator has no precommitment ability for an emission tax. Results reveal that if the environmental damage is slight, or given severe environmental damage and large inefficiency in environmental R&D costs, then social welfare under environmental research joint venture (ERJV) cartelization is higher than in the other three scenarios: environmental R&D competition, environmental R&D cartelization, and ERJV competition. However, if environmental damage is severe, and if a firm's R&D costs are limited, then, in stark contrast to results of previous studies, environmental R&D competition is socially superior to any of the other three scenarios, although R&D competition is a case without information sharing and R&D coordination. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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