Lies, Common Ground and Performative Utterances
| Autor: | Neri Marsili |
|---|---|
| Přispěvatelé: | Neri Marsili |
| Rok vydání: | 2021 |
| Předmět: |
Lying
Performative Utterances Speech Act Theory Common Ground Context Assertion Deception Logic Philosophy 05 social sciences Assertion Common ground Performative utterance 06 humanities and the arts 050905 science studies 0603 philosophy ethics and religion Epistemology 060302 philosophy Ontology 0509 other social sciences Lying |
| Zdroj: | Erkenntnis. 88:567-578 |
| ISSN: | 1572-8420 0165-0106 |
| Popis: | In a recent book (Lying and insincerity, Oxford University Press, 2018), Andreas Stokke argues that one lies iff one says something one believes to be false, thereby proposing that it becomes common ground. This paper shows that Stokke’s proposal is unable to draw the right distinctions about insincere performative utterances. The objection also has repercussions on theories of assertion, because it poses a novel challenge to any attempt to define assertion as a proposal to update the common ground. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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