Empirical methodology for the evaluation of collusive behaviour in vertically-related markets: an application to the 'yogurt cartel' in France
| Autor: | Céline Bonnet, Zohra Bouamra-Mechemache |
|---|---|
| Přispěvatelé: | Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), Université Toulouse 1 Capitole (UT1), Université Fédérale Toulouse Midi-Pyrénées-Université Fédérale Toulouse Midi-Pyrénées-École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement (INRAE), École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Université Toulouse 1 Capitole (UT1), Université Fédérale Toulouse Midi-Pyrénées-Université Fédérale Toulouse Midi-Pyrénées |
| Jazyk: | angličtina |
| Rok vydání: | 2020 |
| Předmět: |
Economics and Econometrics
cartel National brand media_common.quotation_subject collusion Supply and demand Profit sharing 0502 economics and business profit sharing 050207 economics B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE Industrial organization media_common 040101 forestry Product category 05 social sciences Cartel 04 agricultural and veterinary sciences [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance Private label private label Collusion 0401 agriculture forestry and fisheries Bargaining Business Law Welfare Finance |
| Zdroj: | International Review of Law and Economics International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, 2020, 61, ⟨10.1016/j.irle.2019.105872⟩ International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, 2019, in Press |
| ISSN: | 0144-8188 |
| Popis: | National audience; The paper proposes a five-step methodology based on the estimation of demand and supply models to test the existence of manufacturers’ collusive behaviour and evaluate its impact on market and welfare. This methodology allows for the estimation of profit sharing in vertical chains by properly modelling the contracting stage between manufacturers and retailers. We apply this methodology to analyse the effects of the "yogurt cartel" that prevailed in the French dairy dessert market between private label providers during the period 2006-2012. We find that data supports collusive behaviour between private label manufacturers, and lead to average price increase varying from 7.3% and 11.3%, according to the product category. We found an umbrella effect on dairy products sold under national brands at the wholesale level but not at the retail level. The cartel benefits manufacturers both for the sales of the national brand and private label products, while retailers lost profits over the private label products but gained profits over the national brand products. The cartel implies a relatively low decrease in consumer welfare —lower than the gain for the industry—such that the overall welfare effect of the cartel is positive. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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