Need knowing and acting be SSS-Safe?
| Autor: | Niall Paterson, Jaakko Hirvelä |
|---|---|
| Přispěvatelé: | Department of Philosophy, History and Art Studies |
| Jazyk: | angličtina |
| Předmět: |
competence
05 social sciences dispositions 06 humanities and the arts 0603 philosophy ethics and religion 050105 experimental psychology Epistemology SSS 611 Philosophy Philosophy intentional action the safety principle 060302 philosophy 0501 psychology and cognitive sciences virtue epistemology Virtue epistemology Psychology Competence (human resources) |
| Zdroj: | Thought: A Journal of Philosophy. 10(2):127-134 |
| ISSN: | 2161-2234 |
| DOI: | 10.1002/tht3.487 |
| Popis: | Throughout the years, Sosa has taken different views on the safety condition on knowledge. In his early work, he endorsed the safety condition, but later retracted this view when first developing his much discussed virtue epistemology. Recently, Sosa has further developed his virtue theory with the notion of competence and has developed an accompanying, modified safety condition that he maintains is entailed by that theory: the SSS-safety condition. Sosa's view is that this condition holds on both knowledge and action, because both knowledge and action are the manifestations of competence. The SSS-safety condition, roughly, says that if S were to make an attempt at phi-ing under certain specified shape-situation pairs, holding fixed their seat, then S would phi. The argument of this paper is that this new SSS-safety condition does not hold on either knowledge or action. We argue for this conclusion by providing a principled way to generate counterexamples to the condition for both knowledge and action. The reasoning is that there can exist a non-empty symmetric difference between the sets of shape-situation pairs under which distinct agents can manifest their epistemic and pragmatic competences, and if there can exist such a symmetric difference then the SSS-safety condition fails to hold. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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