Equilibrium paths in discounted supergames
| Autor: | Mitri Kitti, Kimmo Berg |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2019 |
| Předmět: |
Sequential equilibrium
Dimension (graph theory) 0211 other engineering and technologies Symmetric equilibrium 0102 computer and information sciences 02 engineering and technology Subgame-perfect equilibrium 01 natural sciences Subgame perfect equilibrium Combinatorics Set (abstract data type) Discrete Mathematics and Combinatorics Computer Science::Data Structures and Algorithms repeated game subgame-perfect equilibrium equilibrium path graph presentation of paths complexity Mathematics Graph presentation of paths Applied Mathematics jel:C72 ta111 Equilibrium path jel:C73 021107 urban & regional planning Complexity Directed graph Markov perfect equilibrium 010201 computation theory & mathematics Repeated game |
| Zdroj: | Discrete Applied Mathematics. 260:1-27 |
| ISSN: | 0166-218X |
| Popis: | This paper characterizes the subgame-perfect pure-strategy equilibrium paths in discounted supergames with perfect monitoring. It is shown that all the equilibrium paths are composed of fragments called elementary subpaths. This characterization result is complemented with an algorithm for finding the elementary subpaths. By using these subpaths it is possible to generate equilibrium paths and payoffs. When there are finitely many elementary subpaths, all the equilibrium paths can be represented by a directed graph. These graphs can be used in analyzing the complexity of equilibrium outcomes. In particular, it is shown that the size and the density of the equilibrium set can be measured by the asymptotic growth rate of equilibrium paths and the Hausdorff dimension of the payoff set. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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