Mindreading and endogenous beliefs in games

Autor: Lauren Larrouy, Guilhem Lecouteux
Přispěvatelé: Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Economie et Gestion (GREDEG), Université Nice Sophia Antipolis (... - 2019) (UNS), COMUE Université Côte d'Azur (2015-2019) (COMUE UCA)-COMUE Université Côte d'Azur (2015-2019) (COMUE UCA)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Université Côte d'Azur (UCA), H2P2S
Rok vydání: 2017
Předmět:
TheoryofComputation_MISCELLANEOUS
Economics
Econometrics and Finance (miscellaneous)
Bayesian probability
action-dependent beliefs
choice under uncertainty
Bayes' theorem
JEL: B - History of Economic Thought
Methodology
and Heterodox Approaches/B.B4 - Economic Methodology/B.B4.B41 - Economic Methodology
0502 economics and business
Psychological Theory
Epistemic game theory
050207 economics
ComputingMilieux_MISCELLANEOUS
050205 econometrics
prior beliefs
05 social sciences
[SHS.PHIL]Humanities and Social Sciences/Philosophy
ComputingMilieux_PERSONALCOMPUTING
JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D8 - Information
Knowledge
and Uncertainty/D.D8.D81 - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
mindreading
simulation
[SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance
Simulated reality
Chose
JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory/C.C7.C72 - Noncooperative Games
Belief formation
Psychology
Social psychology
Cognitive psychology
Zdroj: Journal of Economic Methodology
Journal of Economic Methodology, Taylor & Francis (Routledge), 2017, 24 (3), pp.318-343. ⟨10.1080/1350178X.2017.1335425⟩
ISSN: 1469-9427
1350-178X
Popis: We argue that a Bayesian explanation of strategic choices in games requires introducing a psychological theory of belief formation. We highlight that beliefs in epistemic game theory are derived from the actual choice of the players, and cannot therefore explain why Bayesian rational players should play the strategy they actually chose. We introduce the players’ capacity of mindreading in a game theoretical framework with the simulation theory, and characterise the beliefs that Bayes rational players could endogenously form in games. We show in particular that those beliefs need not be ratifiable, and therefore that rational players can form action-dependent beliefs.
Databáze: OpenAIRE
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