Feasible sets, comparative risk aversion, and comparative uncertainty aversion in bargaining
| Autor: | Hans Peters, Michele Lombardi, Bram Driesen |
|---|---|
| Přispěvatelé: | QE Math. Economics & Game Theory, RS: GSBE ETBC |
| Jazyk: | angličtina |
| Rok vydání: | 2016 |
| Předmět: |
UTILITY
Economics and Econometrics Bargaining problem OUTCOMES Actuarial science Risk aversion Applied Mathematics 05 social sciences Ambiguity aversion Subjective expected utility Comparative risk aversion AMBIGUITY Microeconomics 0502 economics and business Economics ADDITIVITY Bargaining 050206 economic theory Choquet expected utility Expected utility hypothesis Comparative uncertainty aversion 050205 econometrics |
| Zdroj: | Journal of Mathematical Economics, 67, 162-170. Elsevier Science |
| ISSN: | 0304-4068 |
| Popis: | We study feasible sets of the bargaining problem under two different as-\ud sumptions: the players are subjective expected utility maximizers or the\ud players are Choquet expected utility maximizers. For the latter case, we\ud consider the effects on bargaining solutions when players become more\ud risk averse and when they become more uncertainty averse. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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