How Does Corporate Governance Affect the Quality of Investor Information? The Curious Case of REITs
| Autor: | Desmond Tsang, Robert H. Edelstein, Yanmin Gao, Paul M. Anglin |
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| Rok vydání: | 2011 |
| Předmět: |
Finance
050208 finance business.industry media_common.quotation_subject Corporate governance 05 social sciences Economics Econometrics and Finance (miscellaneous) Accounting Affect (psychology) jel:L85 Real estate investment trust 0502 economics and business Quality (business) Organizational structure Business 050207 economics media_common |
| Zdroj: | Scopus-Elsevier |
| Popis: | Recent research suggests that the unique legal and organizational structure of REITs, relative to other types of corporations, may vitiate the need for and the effectiveness of internal corporate governance. Our results indicate that information asymmetry, as measured by the percentage bid-ask spreads demanded by the market, is reduced by appropriately structured REIT governance. Using data during the 2003-2006 period, we find that increasing the financial incentives for board members reduces asymmetric information, and that the combination of experienced board members and independent audit committees with financial expertise diminishes asymmetric information. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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