A survey on screenlogger attacks as well as countermeasures

Autor: Hugo Sbai, Samy Meftali, Michael Goldsmith, Jassim Happa
Přispěvatelé: Department of Computer Science, University of Oxford, Centre de Recherche en Informatique, Signal et Automatique de Lille - UMR 9189 (CRIStAL), Centrale Lille-Université de Lille-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), University of Oxford [Oxford]
Jazyk: angličtina
Rok vydání: 2020
Předmět:
Zdroj: International Journal of Embedded Systems
International Journal of Embedded Systems, In press
International Journal of Embedded Systems, Inderscience, In press
ISSN: 1741-1068
1741-1076
Popis: Keyloggers and screenloggers are one of the active growing threats to user's confidentiality as they can run in user-space, easily be distributed and upload information to remote servers. They use a wide number of different technologies and may be implemented in many ways. Keyloggers and screenloggers are very largely diverted from their primary and legitimate function to be exploited for malicious purposes compromising the privacy of users, and bank customers notably. Due to the recent multiplication of mobile devices with a touchscreen, the screenlogger threat has become even more dangerous. This threat is even harder to fight given the limited resources of the affected devices. This paper is the first step of a project aiming at proposing efficient countermeasures against screenloggers. It provides a complete overview of the different techniques used by this malware and discusses an extensive set of plausible counter measures.
Databáze: OpenAIRE