Dynamic effects of enforcement on cooperation
| Autor: | Nicolas Jacquemet, Emeric Henry, Roberto Galbiati |
|---|---|
| Přispěvatelé: | EconomiX, Université Paris Nanterre (UPN)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Département d'économie (Sciences Po) (ECON), Sciences Po (Sciences Po)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne (CES), Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (UP1)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Paris School of Economics (PSE), École des Ponts ParisTech (ENPC)-École normale supérieure - Paris (ENS Paris), Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (UP1)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement (INRAE), Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (UP1)-École normale supérieure - Paris (ENS-PSL), Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-École des Ponts ParisTech (ENPC)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement (INRAE) |
| Rok vydání: | 2018 |
| Předmět: |
social values
Social Sciences cooperation Social value orientations Laws Affect (psychology) Experiment persistence of institutions 0502 economics and business Indirect reciprocity 050207 economics Enforcement 050205 econometrics Prisoner's dilemma learning Multidisciplinary Public economics 05 social sciences Institutional spillover experiments [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance repeated games Cooperation Incentive Work (electrical) Repeated game spillovers Business Laboratory experiment |
| Zdroj: | Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (PNAS) (2018-11) Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, National Academy of Sciences, 2018, 115 (49), pp.12425-12428. ⟨10.1073/pnas.1813502115⟩ Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 2018, 115 (49), pp.12425-12428. ⟨10.1073/pnas.1813502115⟩ |
| ISSN: | 1091-6490 0027-8424 |
| Popis: | International audience; In situations where social payoffs are not aligned with private incentives, enforcement with fines can be a way to sustain cooperation. In this paper we show, by the means of a lab experiment , that past fines can have an effect on current behavior even when no longer in force. We document two mechanisms: a) past fines affect directly individuals' future propensity to cooperate; b) when fines for non cooperation are in place in the past, individuals experience higher levels of cooperation from partners and, consistent with indirect reciprocity motives, are in turn nicer towards others once these fines have been removed. This second mechanism is empirically prevalent and, in contrast with the first, induces a snowball effect of past enforcement. Our results can inform the design of costly enforcement policies. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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