MGX: Near-Zero Overhead Memory Protection for Data-Intensive Accelerators
| Autor: | Weizhe Hua, Muhammad Umar, Zhiru Zhang, G. Edward Suh |
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| Rok vydání: | 2020 |
| Předmět: | |
| DOI: | 10.48550/arxiv.2004.09679 |
| Popis: | This paper introduces MGX, a near-zero overhead memory protection scheme for hardware accelerators. MGX minimizes the performance overhead of off-chip memory encryption and integrity verification by exploiting the application-specific properties of the accelerator execution. In particular, accelerators tend to explicitly manage data movement between on-chip and off-chip memories. Therefore, the general memory access pattern of an accelerator can largely be determined for a given application. Exploiting these characteristics, MGX generates version numbers used in memory encryption and integrity verification using on-chip accelerator state rather than storing them in the off-chip memory; it also customizes the granularity of the memory protection to match the granularity used by the accelerator. To demonstrate the efficacy of MGX, we present an in-depth study of MGX for DNN and graph algorithms. Experimental results show that on average, MGX lowers the performance overhead of memory protection from 28% and 33% to 4% and 5% for DNN and graph processing accelerators in a wide range of benchmarks, respectively. Comment: Accepted to the 49th International Symposium on Computer Architecture (ISCA'22) |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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