Cooperation and mistrust in relational contracts
| Autor: | Holger Herz, Armin Schmutzler, André Volk |
|---|---|
| Přispěvatelé: | University of Zurich |
| Rok vydání: | 2016 |
| Předmět: |
Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management
Economics and Econometrics L20 media_common.quotation_subject Distribution (economics) Microeconomics ECON Department of Economics Experiment Information asymmetry 10007 Department of Economics 0502 economics and business ddc:330 incomplete information Relational contracts Quality (business) unvollkommene Information 050207 economics media_common L14 business.industry 05 social sciences Economic rent experiments 330 Economics Kontrakttheorie relational contracts Incentive Work (electrical) Action (philosophy) kooperatives Verhalten D01 Verifiable secret sharing D03 business 050203 business & management |
| DOI: | 10.5167/uzh-125681 |
| Popis: | Work and trade relationships are often governed by relational contracts, in which incentives for cooperative action today stem from the prospective future benefits of the relationship. In this paper, we study how a lack of hard information about the costs of providing quality, and therefore about the financial consequences of actions, affects relational contracts in buyer-seller relationships. The absence of verifiable information can impede the joint understanding of what constitutes cooperative behavior, and may thus inject mistrust into relationships. Comparing seller-buyer relationships with hard (verifiable) and soft (non-verifiable) information about seller costs in the laboratory, we find that soft information affects the terms of relational contracts. Contractual terms are adjusted to the detriment of the uniformed party. However, the uniformed party does not reciprocate these adjustments with efficiency-reducing actions. We therefore find that asymmetric information only affects the distribution of rents, and not efficiency. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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