Corporate Governance in Saudi Arabia: What Happens to Firm Value When the Board of Directors and Ownership Structure Interact

Autor:	Hanan Alhussayen, Ridha Shabou, Durga Prasad Samontaray, Imed Medhioub
Rok vydání:	2020
Předmět:	Structure (mathematical logic) Government Shareholder business.industry Management of Technology and Innovation Corporate governance Enterprise value Principal–agent problem Stock market Accounting Business Business and International Management IBM
Zdroj:	International Journal of Business Innovation and Research. 1:1
ISSN:	1751-0260 1751-0252
DOI:	10.1504/ijbir.2020.10023814
Popis:	The ownership structure can strengthen or weaken the monitoring functions of the board. Therefore, it is intended in this article to analyse how the complexity of the ownership structure affects the relationship between intensive board monitoring and firm value. The study covers all the firms listed in the Saudi stock market, except the firms listed in the banking and insurance sectors, over the period 2008 till 2013. The results of the analysis reveal that the direct ownership of large shareholders in non-complex structures and the joint ownership between the government and family owners and individual investors both complement the monitoring functions of the board. Further the indirect ownership of ultimate owners in complex structures weakens the board monitoring intensity.
Databáze:	OpenAIRE
Externí odkaz:	https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::92d42d426439d08aa78191227dd2af5e https://doi.org/10.1504/ijbir.2020.10023814 Zobrazit plný text záznamu