A sequential bargaining protocol for land rental arrangements

Autor:	Juan Vidal-Puga, Alfredo Valencia-Toledo
Rok vydání:	2020
Předmět:	1207.06 Teoría de Juegos Non-cooperative game Bargaining problem business.industry media_common.quotation_subject Sequential bargaining Unit (housing) Microeconomics Negotiation Renting Economics business General Economics Econometrics and Finance Protocol (object-oriented programming) media_common Nash solution
Zdroj:	Investigo. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidade de Vigo Universidade de Vigo (UVigo)
ISSN:	1434-4750 1434-4742
Popis:	We consider land rental between a single tenant and several lessors. The tenant should negotiate sequentially with each lessor for the available land. In each stage, we apply the Nash bargaining solution, as a short-cut to solving non-cooperative bargaining games. Our results imply that, when all land is necessary, a uniform price per unit is more favorable for the tenant than a lessor-dependent price. Furthermore, a lessor is better off with a lessor-dependent price only when negotiating first. For the tenant, lessors’ merging is relevant with lessor-dependent price but not with uniform price. Ministry of Education of Peru | Ref. PRONABEC Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad | Ref. ECO2014-52616-R Agencia Estatal de Investigación | Ref. ECO2017-82241-R Xunta de Galicia | Ref. ED431B 2019/34
Databáze:	OpenAIRE
Externí odkaz:	https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::91786ceadd73d4f70edb278b41658e36 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-020-00230-7 Zobrazit plný text záznamu Plný text ve formátu PDF Plný text ve formátu HTML
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