| Popis: |
The victory of the USSR in its war against fascist Germany can be understood only in light of the fate of the Russian revolution. The revolution opened the sluice-gates of the creative forces of our country’s people. This found expression, in particular, in industrialisation and in rapid military construction. It also laid the objective foundations for victory in the war when it occurred. The triumphant revolution, however, underwent a degeneration whose effects included undermining the construction of military capability. This principal contradiction of Soviet history manifested itself clearly in the way the military strategy of the Red Army was developed, and in the tragic fate of its authors. The Red Army’s military doctrine was based on the tactic of battle in depth, on the theory of deep defensive and offensive operations, and on the doctrine of strategic defence and strategic counter-attack. With the devastation of the military cadres during the repressions of the 1930s these views were replaced by the Stalinist concept of a war “with minimal bloodshed, and on foreign territory”. This concept failed utterly, in many ways leading to the catastrophe suffered during the summer of 1941. The rebirth of the Red Army and the turn in the course of the war were associated with an unacknowledged return to the heritage of the repressed Red commanders. The Stalinist Thermidor thus placed in question the very existence of the Soviet state, whose survival depended on a return to the legacy of the Bolshevik Revolution. |
