Negative Voters? Electoral Competition with Loss-Aversion
| Autor: | Ben Lockwood, James Rockey |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2020 |
| Předmět: |
JF
Ideal point jel:D81 Economics and Econometrics Labour economics Status quo media_common.quotation_subject 05 social sciences jel:D72 Legislature Rigidity (psychology) Moderation 0506 political science Microeconomics D1 Loss aversion 0502 economics and business 050602 political science & public administration Economics electoral competition loss-aversion incumbency advantage platform rigidity 050207 economics media_common |
| Zdroj: | The Economic Journal. 130:2619-2648 |
| ISSN: | 1468-0297 0013-0133 |
| DOI: | 10.1093/ej/ueaa037 |
| Popis: | This paper studies how voter loss-aversion affects electoral competition in a Downsian setting. Assuming that the voters’ reference point is the status quo, we show that loss-aversion has a number of effects. First, for some values of the status quo, there is policy rigidity both parties choose platforms equal to the status quo, regardless of other parameters. Second, there is a moderation effect when there is policy rigidity, the equilibrium policy outcome is closer to the moderate voters’ ideal point than in the absence of loss-aversion. In a dynamic extension of the model, we consider how parties strategically manipulate the status quo to their advantage, and we find that this increases policy rigidity. Finally, we show that with loss-aversion, incumbents adjust less than challengers to changes in voter preferences. The underlying force is that the status quo works to the advantage of the incumbent. This prediction of asymmetric adjustment is new, and we test it using elections to US state legislatures. The results are as predicted: incumbent parties respond less to shocks in the preferences of the median voter. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
|
| Nepřihlášeným uživatelům se plný text nezobrazuje | K zobrazení výsledku je třeba se přihlásit. |