The division problem with maximal capacity constraints
| Autor: | Alejandro Neme, Jordi Massó, Gustavo Bergantiños |
|---|---|
| Jazyk: | angličtina |
| Rok vydání: | 2012 |
| Předmět: |
Capacity constraints
5399 Otras Especialidades económicas Uniform rule Interval (mathematics) Upper and lower bounds Set (abstract data type) D71 ddc:330 Single peaked preferences Mathematics division problem Unteilbarkeit Single-peaked preferences Abstimmungsregel Extension (predicate logic) Division (mathematics) Division problema Öffentliche Güter Neue politische Ökonomie Constraint (information theory) Economia matemàtica Allokation Verifiable secret sharing General Economics Econometrics and Finance Mathematical economics Theorie |
| Zdroj: | Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona Investigo. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidade de Vigo Universidade de Vigo (UVigo) Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya instname Recercat: Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya Varias* (Consorci de Biblioteques Universitáries de Catalunya, Centre de Serveis Científics i Acadèmics de Catalunya) |
| Popis: | We thank an anonymous referee whose comments and suggestions helped us to write a better paper. The work of G. Bergantiños is partially supported by research grant ECO2008-03484-C02-01 from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation and FEDER. Support for the research of J. Massó was received through the prize "ICREA Acadèmia" for excellence in research, funded by the Generalitat de Catalunya. He also acknowledges the support of MOVE (where he is an affiliated researcher), of the Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (where he is an affiliated professor), and of the Government of Catalonia, through grant SGR2009-419. His work is also supported by the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation through grants ECO2008-04756 (Grupo Consolidado-C) and CONSOLIDER-INGENIO 2010 (CDS2006-00016). The work of A. Neme is partially supported by the Universidad Nacional de San Luis through grant 319502 and by the Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas (CONICET) through grant PICT-02114. Altres ajuts: UNSL/319502 Altres ajuts: PICT-02114 The division problem consists of allocating a given amount of an homogeneous and perfectly divisible good among a group of agents with single-peaked preferences on the set of their potential shares. A rule proposes a vector of shares for each division problem. Most of the literature has implicitly assumed that all divisions are feasible. In this paper we consider the division problem when each agent has a maximal capacity due to an objective and verifiable feasibility constraint which imposes an upper bound on his share. Then each agent has a feasible interval of shares where his preferences are single-peaked. A rule has to propose to each agent a feasible share.We focus mainly on strategy-proof, efficient and consistent rules and provide alternative characterizations of the extension of the uniform rule that deals explicitly with agents' maximal capacity constraints |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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