A revision of the theory of fundamental legal concepts

Autor:	Jorge L. Rodríguez, Claudina Orunesu
Rok vydání:	2019
Předmět:	Reductionism norm-propositions fundamental legal concepts Hohfeld (W. N.) legal obligation power conferring norms Kelsen (Hans) Epistemology Character (mathematics) sanction Criticism Sociology Obligation Law norms
Zdroj:	Revus. :7-35
ISSN:	1855-7112 1581-7652
DOI:	10.4000/revus.5667
Popis:	Although they come from different traditions, Hans Kelsen and W. N. Hohfeld have offered two essential contributions to the clarification of fundamental legal concepts. After a brief review of their proposals, certain problematic aspects of their reconstructions will be analyzed in the light of categories developed by Eugenio Bulygin, in particular his criticism of the reductionist conceptions of norms, the non-prescriptive character of power-conferring rules, and the distinction between norms and norm-propositions. On this basis, and starting from the concept of legal obligation, an outline of an alternative reconstruction of the theory of fundamental legal concepts will be presented. | The Spanish original of this article was published in Revus (2018) 36.
Databáze:	OpenAIRE
Externí odkaz:	https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::8b63e951c1313a139bd5c4c769298546 https://doi.org/10.4000/revus.5667 Zobrazit plný text záznamu