Explanation impossible

Autor: Sam Baron, Mark Colyvan
Rok vydání: 2020
Předmět:
Zdroj: Philosophical Studies. 178:559-576
ISSN: 1573-0883
0031-8116
DOI: 10.1007/s11098-020-01445-8
Popis: We argue that explanations appealing to logical impossibilities are genuine explanations. Our defense is based on a certain picture of impossibility. Namely, that there are impossibilities and that the impossibilities have structure. Assuming this broad picture of impossibility we defend the genuineness of explanations that appeal to logical impossibilities against three objections. First, that such explanations are at odds with the perceived conceptual connection between explanation and counterfactual dependence. Second, that there are no genuinely contrastive why-questions that involve logical impossibilities and, third, that explanations appealing to logical impossibilities rule nothing out.
Databáze: OpenAIRE