Inefficient public provision in a repeated elections model
| Autor: | Georges Casamatta, Caroline De Paoli |
|---|---|
| Přispěvatelé: | Lieux, Identités, eSpaces, Activités (LISA), Université Pascal Paoli (UPP)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), International business school (IBS), International business school |
| Jazyk: | angličtina |
| Rok vydání: | 2007 |
| Předmět: |
Economics and Econometrics
Sociology and Political Science Public economics Taste (sociology) media_common.quotation_subject 05 social sciences Public good Payment 0506 political science [SHS]Humanities and Social Sciences Microeconomics 0502 economics and business 050602 political science & public administration Economics 050207 economics Form of the Good B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE Finance ComputingMilieux_MISCELLANEOUS media_common |
| Zdroj: | Journal of Public Economic Theory Journal of Public Economic Theory, Wiley, 2007, 9 (6), pp.1103-1126. ⟨10.1111/j.1467-9779.2007.00332.x⟩ |
| ISSN: | 1097-3923 1467-9779 |
| DOI: | 10.1111/j.1467-9779.2007.00332.x⟩ |
| Popis: | We consider a dynamic setting with no policy commitment. Two parties that compete for election must choose the level of provision of a public good as well as the tax payment needed to finance it. The cost of producing the good may be high or low and this information is not known to the voters. We show that there exists an equilibrium in which the party that does not want much of the public good uses the inefficient (high cost) technology even though the efficient one is available. Using the low cost technology would, by informing the voters about the cost parameter, force it to produce an excessively high level of the good in the future. Interestingly, this equilibrium is not symmetric, suggesting that a party with a strong taste for the public good is less likely to adopt a wasteful policy. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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