On the Composition of Committees
| Autor: | Otto H. Swank, Klaas J. Beniers |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2004 |
| Předmět: |
jel:D81
Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management Economics and Econometrics Point (typography) media_common.quotation_subject jel:D83 Decision maker Optimal composition Affect (psychology) Group decision-making Incentive Quality (business) Business Marketing Law Composition (language) committees information collection preference outliers moderates media_common |
| Zdroj: | Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization. 20:353-378 |
| ISSN: | 1465-7341 |
| DOI: | 10.1093/jleo/ewh037 |
| Popis: | This discussion paper led to a publication in the 'Journal of Law, Economics & Organization', 2004, 20, 353-378. This paper is concerned with the role of committees in collective decision-makingprocesses in a world where agents must be motivated to collect information. Committees improvethe quality of decision-making by providing information and by coordinating the collection ofinformation. We address two types of questions. First, how does the composition of a committeeaffect final decisions? Second, what is the optimal composition of a committee from thedecision maker's point of view? As to the latter question, we show that the cost of informationcollection plays an important role. If this cost is low, then the preferences of the committeemembers should be aligned to those of the decision maker. Members with similar preferences asthe decision maker collect the proper pieces of information. Moreover, manipulation ofinformation does not occur if the preferences of the decision maker and the members areconsonant. If the cost of searching is high, then the committee should be composed ofmembers with polarized preferences. Outliers have a strong incentive to search for information. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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