New active blockholders and adjustment of CEO relative incentive ratios
| Autor: | Phuong Lan Nguyen, Neal Galpin, Garry Twite |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2022 |
| Předmět: |
History
Economics and Econometrics Executive compensation Polymers and Plastics Strategy and Management media_common.quotation_subject Equity (finance) Monetary economics Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering Incentive Debt Economics Business Business and International Management Finance media_common |
| Zdroj: | Journal of Corporate Finance. 72:102127 |
| ISSN: | 0929-1199 |
| DOI: | 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2021.102127 |
| Popis: | We study the emergence of blockholders as an important mechanism that corrects deviations from target CEO relative debt-to-equity incentive ratios. We find that a new active blockholder more likely emerges when a firm deviates from target; deviations fall during the period the blockholder owns shares; and deviations fall more when the blockholder appoints a director to the firm. When a firm is above (below) target, blockholders are associated with less (more) inside debt and more (no change in) inside equity, implying there is no “one-size-fits-all” compensation change for blockholders. Outside debt and equity increase for both above and below target firms. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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