Costly Pretrial Agreements

Autor: Giovanni Immordino, Leonardo Felli, Luca Anderlini
Přispěvatelé: Immordino, Giovanni, Anderlini, Luca, Leonardo, Felli, Felli, Leonardo [0000-0001-6113-6014], Apollo - University of Cambridge Repository
Rok vydání: 2019
Předmět:
Zdroj: Anderlini, L, Felli, L & Immordino, G 2019, ' Costly pretrial agreements ', Journal of Legal Studies, vol. 48, no. 1, pp. 159–188 . https://doi.org/10.1086/699841
ISSN: 1537-5366
0047-2530
DOI: 10.1086/699841
Popis: © 2019 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved. Settling a legal dispute involves some costs that the parties have to incur ex ante for the pretrial negotiation and possible agreement to become feasible. Even in a full-information world, if the distribution of these costs is sufficiently mismatched with the distribution of the parties’ bargaining powers, a pretrial agreement may never be reached even though litigation is overall wasteful. Our results shed light on two key issues. First, a plaintiff may initiate a lawsuit even though the parties fully anticipate that it will be settled out of court. Second, the likelihood that a given lawsuit goes to trial is unaffected by how trial costs are distributed among the litigants. The choice of fee-shifting rule can affect only whether the plaintiff files a lawsuit in the first place. It does not affect whether it is settled before trial or litigated.
Databáze: OpenAIRE
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