A profit-sharing interpretation of shapley value for N-person games
| Autor: | Richard L. Eisenman |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 1967 |
| Předmět: |
Class (set theory)
Information Systems and Management Psychometrics Strategy and Management Decision Making TheoryofComputation_GENERAL General Social Sciences Models Psychological A share Shapley value Interpretation (model theory) Set (abstract data type) Profit sharing Action (philosophy) Economics Humans Interpersonal Relations General Agricultural and Biological Sciences Value (mathematics) Mathematical economics Probability |
| Zdroj: | Behavioral Science. 12:396-398 |
| ISSN: | 1099-1743 0005-7940 |
| DOI: | 10.1002/bs.3830120506 |
| Popis: | Shapley value measures the relative strengths of players in the formation of coalitions. This article provides a new interpretation of Shapley value by reshuffling its mathematical formula. As a result, the concept of value is extended to a broader class of models of social action. Specifically, certain social structures are to be specified as allowable sets of player sets. Each player takes a share from each set to which he belongs and gives a share to each set which excludes him. In this approach, the original Shapley value arises when the allowable sets are the ones with the minimum number of partitions in which each player combination occurs at least once. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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