Species natures: A critique of neo-aristotelian ethics
| Autor: | Tim Lewens |
|---|---|
| Přispěvatelé: | Lewens, Tim [0000-0002-4617-9216], Apollo - University of Cambridge Repository |
| Rok vydání: | 2019 |
| Předmět: |
Kantian projectivism
Philosophy 05 social sciences Michael Thompson 06 humanities and the arts neo-Aristotelianism 0603 philosophy ethics and religion Philippa Foot 050105 experimental psychology Epistemology Aristotelian ethics 060302 philosophy life-forms 0501 psychology and cognitive sciences species natures |
| DOI: | 10.17863/cam.46141 |
| Popis: | This paper examines the neo-Aristotelian account of species natures as ‘life-forms’, which we owe to Philippa Foot, Michael Thompson and their defenders. I begin by developing two problems for their view: a problem of underdetermination and a problem generated by psychological work on ‘folk essentialism’. I move on to consider their important transcendental argument, which suggests that claims about life-forms are presupposed by all efforts to describe the organic world. In response, I sketch a neo-Kantian projectivist position, which agrees that life-forms are presupposed in these contexts, while denying that such life-forms are real. This position makes a better sense of the phenomena cited in support of the neo-Aristotelian view, while avoiding the problems raised for that view in the first half of this paper. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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