Volatility-reducing biodiversity conservation under strategic interactions

Autor: Emmanuelle Augeraud-Véron, Katheline Schubert, Giorgio Fabbri
Přispěvatelé: Groupe de Recherche en Economie Théorique et Appliquée (GREThA), Université de Bordeaux (UB)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Laboratoire d'Economie Appliquée de Grenoble (GAEL), Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement (INRAE)-Université Grenoble Alpes (UGA)-Institut polytechnique de Grenoble - Grenoble Institute of Technology (Grenoble INP ), Université Grenoble Alpes (UGA), Paris School of Economics (PSE), École des Ponts ParisTech (ENPC)-École normale supérieure - Paris (ENS Paris), Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (UP1)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement (INRAE), ANR-15-IDEX-0002,UGA,IDEX UGA(2015), Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Université de Bordeaux (UB)
Jazyk: angličtina
Rok vydání: 2021
Předmět:
0106 biological sciences
Economics and Econometrics
Natural resource economics
JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D6 - Welfare Economics/D.D6.D62 - Externalities
010603 evolutionary biology
01 natural sciences
insurance value
symbols.namesake
JEL: Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics • Environmental and Ecological Economics/Q.Q1 - Agriculture/Q.Q1.Q10 - General
JEL: Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics • Environmental and Ecological Economics/Q.Q5 - Environmental Economics/Q.Q5.Q56 - Environment and Development • Environment and Trade • Sustainability • Environmental Accounts and Accounting • Environmental Equity • Population Growth
0502 economics and business
JEL: Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics • Environmental and Ecological Economics/Q.Q1 - Agriculture/Q.Q1.Q15 - Land Ownership and Tenure • Land Reform • Land Use • Irrigation • Agriculture and Environment
JEL: O - Economic Development
Innovation
Technological Change
and Growth/O.O2 - Development Planning and Policy/O.O2.O20 - General
Economics
Deadweight loss
land conversion
Agricultural productivity
JEL: Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics • Environmental and Ecological Economics/Q.Q5 - Environmental Economics/Q.Q5.Q58 - Government Policy
050205 econometrics
General Environmental Science
2. Zero hunger
JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory/C.C7.C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games • Evolutionary Games • Repeated Games
Land use
business.industry
Risk aversion
05 social sciences
1. No poverty
stochastic dierential games
Biodiversity
15. Life on land
JEL: O - Economic Development
Innovation
Technological Change
and Growth/O.O1 - Economic Development/O.O1.O13 - Agriculture • Natural Resources • Energy • Environment • Other Primary Products
[SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance
recursive preferences
13. Climate action
Agriculture
Property rights
Nash equilibrium
symbols
Stochastic differential games
Volatility (finance)
business
Zdroj: Ecological Economics
Ecological Economics, Elsevier, 2021, 190, ⟨10.1016/j.ecolecon.2021.107193⟩
ISSN: 0921-8009
DOI: 10.1016/j.ecolecon.2021.107193⟩
Popis: International audience; How can decentralized individual decisions inefficiently reduce the ability of biodiversity to mitigate ecological and environmental variability and then its "natural insurance" role? In this article we present a simple theoretical setup to address this question and to evaluate some policy options. We study a model of strategic competition among farmers for the conversion of a natural forest to agricultural land. Unconverted forest land allows to conserve biodiversity, which contributes to reducing the volatility of agricultural production. Agents' utility is given in terms of a Kreps Porteus stochastic differential utility capable of disentangling risk aversion and aversion to fluctuations. We characterize the land used by each farmer and her welfare at the Nash equilibrium, we evaluate the overexploitation of the land and the agents' welfare loss compared to the socially optimal solution and we study the drivers of the inefficiencies of the decentralized equilibrium. After characterizing the value of biodiversity in the model, we use it to obtain a decomposition which helps to study the policy implications of the model by identifying in which cases the allocation of property rights is preferable to the introduction of a tax on land conversion. Our results suggest that enforcing property rights is more relevant in case of stagnant economies while taxing land conversion may be more suited for rapidly developing economies.
Databáze: OpenAIRE
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