How complex are the contracts offered by health plans?
| Autor: | Marcos Vera-Hernandez, Pau Olivella |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2010 |
| Předmět: |
L13
I11 adverse selection Adverse Selektion Private Krankenversicherung Adverse selection health plans competition differentiation Competitive equilibrium Microeconomics Competition (economics) D82 Asymmetrische Information Horizontal differentiation Information asymmetry Specialization (functional) ddc:330 Economics Versicherungsökonomik Set (psychology) General Economics Econometrics and Finance Industrial organization Public finance |
| Zdroj: | Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya instname Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona Recercat: Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya Varias* (Consorci de Biblioteques Universitáries de Catalunya, Centre de Serveis Científics i Acadèmics de Catalunya) |
| ISSN: | 1869-4195 1869-4187 |
| DOI: | 10.1007/s13209-010-0026-3 |
| Popis: | Financial support by a Marie Curie Fellowship under contract no. HPMF-CT-01206. Olivella acknowledges financial support from projects SEJ2006-00538, ECO2009-7616, Consolider-Ingenio CSD2006-16, 2009SGR-169, and Barcelona Economics-Xarxa CREA. Olivella is a Research Fellow of MOVE (Markets, Organizations and Votes in Economics) When health plans compete under adverse selection, the competitive equilibrium set of contracts is unique. However, the allocation of these contracts among health plans is undetermined. We show that three health plans suffice to sustain an equilibrium where each health plan offers a single contract and attracts a single type of agent (full specialization). We also show that this equilibrium can be ruled out by introducing any horizontal differentiation, and that if in equilibrium each health plan attracts all types of agents, at least one of the health plans must do so through a menu of contracts. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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